The categories of open learners (due to Fong, Spivak and Tuyéras) and open games (due to the present author, Ghani, Winschel and Zahn) bear a very striking and unexpected similarity. The purpose of this short note is to prove that there is a faithful symmetric monoidal functor from the former to the latter, which means that any supervised neural network (without feedback or other complicating features) can be seen as an open game in a canonical way. Roughly, each parameter is controlled by a different player, and the game's best response relation encodes the dynamics of gradient descent. We suggest paths for further work exploiting the link.
Introduction
We give an overview of the motivation for open learners and open games, but for the formal definitions and more context we refer the reader to [FST17] for open learners and [GHWZ18] for open games. We will use the notation of both of those papers. More detail on open games can be found in [Hed16, Hed18] .
An open learner X → Y is a supervised learning system that learns a function X → Y by being presented with a sequence of pairs (x, y). This function is determined by a set of parameters, which are updated each time a new (x, y) pair is presented. Open learners are very general, but contain neural networks (at least, those consisting simply of a finite sequence of layers) as a special case by explicitly encoding backpropagation and gradient descent. Open learners form the morphisms of a symmetric monoidal category Learn whose objects are sets, where categorical composition and monoidal product correspond to sequential and parallel composition of learning systems, which includes end-to-end and side-by-side composition of neural networks as a special case. The resulting compositionality of the backpropagation and gradient descent semantics is the main motivation for studying open learners.
An open game
R is a fragment of a non-cooperative game that starts in an initial state X that players can (potentially) observe, and with their choices determining a final state in Y . Players act rationally (in the sense of classical game theory) in order to optimise a value in R (which is typically R n with each player attempting to maximise one coordinate), and a 'co-value' in S is passed back to act as the value for players in the past. Instead of parameters we have strategies for players, and instead of updating parameters we have a 'best response' relation on strategy profiles. In general this cannot be viewed as a dynamics (in the sense that iterating it is not an interesting thing to do), but we are interested in fixpoints of it, which are Nash equilibria, or mutually nonself-defeating choices of strategies. Open games form the morphisms of a symmetric monoidal category Game whose objects are pairs of sets, where categorical composition and monoidal product correspond to sequential and parallel play.
Whereas parameter updating of an open learner takes place in the 'context' of a pair (x, y), best response of an open game takes place in the context of a pair (x, k) where x ∈ X is the initial state and k : Y → R is the 'continuation'. This k contains strictly more information than a single point y; specifically it encodes counterfactuals, saying what the payoffs would be if some other choices had been made. From a categorical point of view, this prevents our functor from being full. We suggest that this is the sole significant distinction between (elementary) machine learning and (elementary) game theory.
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Notice that there is an exact correspondence between parameters/strategies, implementation/play and request/coplay. The only nontrivial part of this definition is converting update to best response, which also uses implementation. This means that throughout this note there is nothing to prove except for the final case, which nevertheless takes some work.
Notice in particular that the relation B F (A) (h, k) is always a functional relation, i.e. every p ∈ P A is related to exactly one thing, namely U A (p, h, k(I A (p, h))).
In both Learn and Game, morphisms are formally defined as equivalence classes. 
Proof. Let A ∼ B : X → Y be equivalent games, so there is a bijection i : P A → P B that respects implementation, update and request. Immediately i :
respects play and coplay, so we need only check that it respects best response. For h :
3 Categorical structure 
Proposition 2. F takes identities in Learn to identities in Game.
Proof. Let id X : X → X be an identity in Learn. Then the best response relation
as required. 
Proof. Take a composable pair of open learners, A = (P
The open game F (B • A) :
On the other hand, the open game F (A) :
and the open game F (B) :
Putting these together, the open game F (B) • F (A) : q, y)) ). This expands to the set of ((p, q), (p ′ , q ′ )) where
Comparing to the above, we see that
Proposition 4. F is faithful.
Proof. Let A, B : X → Y be open learners. We show that if there is an equivalence of open games F (A) ∼ F (B) then there is an equivalence of open learners A ∼ B.
Suppose we have such a bijection i : P A → P B . It immediately respects implementation and request. For any p ∈ P A , x ∈ X and y ∈ Y , define k :
y).
This proves that A ∼ B.
Monoidal structure Proposition 5. For any open learners A, B, F (A ⊗ B) = F (A) ⊗ F (B).
Proof. Suppose that A = X → Y and B : W → Z. Again, it is only necessary to check update/best response. The update function of A ⊗ B is
Then the best response relation of F (A ⊗ B) is
On the other hand, F (A) :
and F (B) :
where , I B (τ, w) )), and k 2 : Z → Z is given by k 2 (z) = π 2 (k (I A (σ, x), z) ). This expands to
as required.
Proposition 6. F is a strict symmetric monoidal functor.
Proof. F takes the structure morphisms of Learn to structure morphisms of Game.
In compositional game theory, particular emphasis is placed on a certain family of open games ε X : Proof. For each set X consider the open learner ! X : X → 1 with set of parameters P ! X = 1 and request function r ! X ( * , x, * ) = x. (The implementation and update functions both have codomain 1, and hence are trivial.) We see immediately that F (! X ) = ε X .
Outlook
We have presented a formal connection between machine learning and game theory, and as such, it suggests applications of each to the other. Above all, the link is in need of attention from somebody knowledgeable about machine learning from an applied perspective.
After several pages of theory, we re-state in English what we have: a canonical way to view any (sufficiently simple) neural network (and more general learning algorithms) as a fragment of a game. Each parameter to be learned acts as though it is controlled by one player, and the best response relation encodes parameter updating. Note that for games in general the best response relation should not be thought of as a 'dynamics', and iterating it will typically not converge to equilibrium, however games that result from learning algorithms do have an interesting best response dynamics. .4] but with the players' "best response" functions were co-opted to perform a single step of gradient descent (with a very naive numerical implementation) rather than arg max. Iterating the resulting best response of the composite was found to converge rapidly to the market equilibrium. This was inspired by the link with open learners, but was not formally an example of it. Can it be made into a formal example, and does this suggest good ways to structure equilibriumapproximating programs?
4. Can this idea be used to put game theory on a more realistic foundation with players who learn in a similar way to humans, without throwing away all of the benefits of having a theory at all? 8. Can we systematically design more general GAN-like machine learning systems, for example having two networks playing a non-zero-sum game, or having more than two networks interacting? Can analysis techniques from game theory help guide us to designs that have the properties we want?
9. By designing games whose players are learning agents implementing using neural networks, can we achieve a 'best of all words' hybrid theory combining game theory, multiagent systems and machine learning?
10. Finally, a purely theoretical problem: to simplify and modularise the proof given here. Open games can be factorised in terms of lenses [Hed18] , and a similar factorisation is possible for open learners (work in progress by Brendan Fong and Mike Johnson). However the functor F does not respect these two factorisations.
As a result the author was unable to find a good way to modularise the proofs given in this paper, and instead presented them monolithically and ad-hoc, which is unsatisfying.
